average temperature http://www.actoncopenhagen.decc.gov.uk/content/en/embeds/flash/4-degrees-largemap-final accessed 22/10/09). The anticipated impacts have prompted global concern about the viability of societies with an economic infrastructure reliant on energy from fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas), and natural resource consumption beyond the sustainable capacity of the planet (Hulme, 2009; IPCC, 2007; Simms and Smith, 2008 ).
Attempts to govern climate are however characterised by deep disagreement: about authority and responsibility, accurate measurements of emissions and equivalences between greenhouse gases, the scale of risks, the effectiveness of carbon markets vs carbon taxes, and shares of costs and benefits. Global governance ambitions are coordinated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and have centred on means for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from human activity, with the espoused goal of limiting average increases in temperature to no more than 2C. The Kyoto Protocol, initially agreed in 1997, has been the key device of multilateralism. It treats the nation state as the main actor, adopting a hierarchical model of climate governance (Hulme, 2009) , which has attracted both praise and criticism. Member states of the EU have so far proved the most willing to set explicit emissions reduction targets. The Climate Change (Scotland) Act is notable for its ambition, with targets for reducing emissions by 42 per cent (from 1990 levels) by 2020, with an 80 per cent reduction target for 2050.
Scottish Ministers are required to set annual targets from 2010 to 2050 and to report regularly to Parliament. The Act includes provisions relating to adaptation, forestry, energy efficiency and waste reduction as well as public engagement.
The envisaged transformation in energy and consumption infrastructures is without precedent: the Stern Review (2006) for example notes that the UK 1990s 'dash for gas' in electricity generation resulted in annual greenhouse gas emission reductions of only 1%, and this measure of 'reduced emissions' was achieved only by excluding the increased emissions from international shipping and aviation. In addition, although the record shows the UK as having already exceeded its 2012 Kyoto target of a 12.5% reduction relative to 1990, measured CO2 emissions have in fact increased since 2002, despite the introduction of the UK Climate Change Programme in 2000. Prior to this period, UK reductions can be attributed to closures in the coal industry, and the off-shoring of emissions from energy-intensive steel and other manufactured goods to countries such as China and India (Helm et al 2007) .
This raises questions about the viability of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act and whether Scottish government and society can meet the targets. The Scottish legislation has courageously set a higher interim target (42% reduction relative to 1990 levels) than the UK 34% target. The EU is committed to cut its emissions to and taxation, or energy efficiency standards for manufactured goods. It does however control building standards and planning regulations, enabling considerable control over energy infrastructure, and it can use public finances to shape economic activity and investment. Nevertheless this means that the Scottish government is working to targets which are not straightforwardly within its competency to deliver, placing significant emphasis on the need for transformation through wide public commitment and action to achieve targets.
So how prepared are the Scottish public to respond to the major social and economic innovations implied by implementing such measures, and does Scottish public opinion differ from the rest of the UK? Do people commonly give high priority to concerns about natural, or environmental, resources, and to what extent do the public regard themselves as knowledgeable about climate change and its implications for societal security and well-being? Is there evidence that people are making changes to habitual patterns of consumption and do they regard themselves as having any responsibility for tackling carbon emissions?
What is Known about Scottish Environmental Attitudes and Behaviours?
These questions are examined through secondary analysis of a subset of the data from the government-sponsored Scottish Environmental Attitudes and Behaviours Survey (SEABS08), accessible from the UK Data Archive. Based on a quota sample of the Scottish adult population (aged 16+), the survey provides systematic, representative evidence about Scottish attitudes and behaviour. Face to face interviews, with 3,054 people, were conducted by Ipsos MORI in respondents' homes between 18 August and 15 November 2008. The findings are reported in detail in Davidson, et al (2009) .
The focus here is on interpretation of these data in relation to questions about current public awareness, assumptions about responsibility, and the potential for societal change of the kinds implied by the legislation. Some comparisons of attitudes and awareness in Scotland and England are made using summary findings from the 2009 Defra survey 1 of English public attitudes.
How Salient are Environmental Issues -Glass Half Empty or Glass Half Full?
A Concern about environmental matters is differentially distributed in the Scottish population. The higher the socio-economic status of the respondent, the more likely they were to refer to environmental issues. Similarly, in relation to level of education, half of those with a degree, or equivalent professional qualification, name environmental issues as important, compared with one quarter of those with least educational qualifications. 2 Using binary logistic regression, and reference categories highest social class and highest levels of educational attainment, the beta coefficient for the lowest social class reduces from 1.685 to 1.302 when education is introduced in the model, whereas the lowest education category reduces from 1.062 to .648. 
Differences between social class and levels of education
As with concern about environmental issues, those in more affluent households, and those with higher levels of educational qualifications, were more likely to claim a lot or a fair amount of knowledge. Binary logistic regression, modelling class and education separately, shows that both have significant effects, but that, modelling both together, the effect of class diminishes when education is introduced, suggesting that this time education has the greater effect 4 .
Differences between men and women in claimed knowledge
Regardless of education, or social class, there is a marked difference between men and women, with 57% of men compared to 40% of women claiming to know a lot or a fair amount about climate change. When social class, education, sex and age are modelled together, the results indicate that education and sex are the more powerful explanatory factors, and are independent of each other in their effect, both remaining significant while social class, and especially age, weaken.
Models do not of course in themselves provide an explanation for this pattern, but they are indicative. Knowledge claims are likely to vary depending on a respondent's imagined 'reference group'. Someone with basic knowledge might say that they 'knew a fair amount' if their implicit comparison was with a presumed wider public with limited knowledge, or conversely that they knew 'not very much' if their implicit comparison was with an expert group. The difference between men and women may suggest a cultural gender difference where men are more likely to claim to be knowledgeable than women, regardless of the topic, or it might mean that they have different reference groups in mind, or indeed that men are more likely than women to have greater knowledge. A similar process may operate in relation to social class and education, with the more educationally qualified and those in higher social classes expressing more confidence in their claim to knowledge.
Overall however the fact that over half (52%) of the Scottish sample (in comparison with 40% of the English sample) claimed to know 'not very much' or nothing at all about climate change, including one quarter of those educated to degree level and 59% of women, highlights the need for high profile, accessible education about climate change, its causes, its likely consequences and the associated policies for change in energy demand and efficiency, and the plans for low carbon energy supply.
Without public engagement, willing participation in measures to reduce carbon emissions will be limited.
Who Do People Trust to Provide Information?
Survey results suggest that effective education about climate change is not however simply a matter of government providing information to a receptive public. Very few people cite government publications or leaflets (11%), or government websites (3%)
as key sources of information. Instead TV and radio news (69% of respondents mention these), and documentaries (57%) are dominant, with around 30% mentioning either broadsheet or tabloid newspapers. The sources regarded as most important were also radio and TV news (36%) or documentaries (29%), while government publications, leaflets or websites were referred to as the most important source by less than 1%.
Independent scientists are the group most likely to be trusted to provide correct information, cited by 45% of respondents, in comparison with government scientists cited by 9%. Those least trusted were the UK government, and tabloid newspapers, each cited by 34%. In comparison, the Scottish government was least trusted by 17%
and most trusted by 12%.
The implications of these findings are that influential routes to education about climate change for the majority are likely to be TV and radio news and documentaries, which are grounded in evidence from independent scientists, whose sources of financial support are also made public. A public sceptical of government motives seems unlikely to be convinced simply by government information and social marketing. Limited trust suggests that government-coordinated projects to improve understanding about climate change, and its social and economic consequences, need to be part of wider ambitions to strengthen participative democracy, treating engagement as two-way, dynamic and dispersed, and not as a one-way flow of information from sender to receiver.
Personal Responsibility and Climate Change
The first report of the UK Committee on Climate Change (2008) There is a considerable gap however between the reductions notionally targeted by legislation and the awareness and preparedness of people to make such changes. Most people do see climate change as a cause for concern: 85% disagreed that 'Climate change will only have an impact on other countries, there is no need for me to worry' and 57% agreed that climate change is an immediate and urgent problem (Davidson et al 2009: 47-48 It might be expected that those for whom the environment is salient would be more likely to see their own activities as implicated, and this expectation is broadly confirmed, with 56-60% of this group disagreeing with the statement 'I don't believe my behaviour and everyday lifestyle contribute to climate change'. Nevertheless over one-quarter of those for whom the environment is salient share the view that their own behaviour is not a contributory factor. When asked about likely causes of climate change, very few respondents referred spontaneously to household contributions, with only 5% mentioning domestic use of gas and electricity, suggesting that most people do not make an immediate connection to domestic consumption of energy, although a higher proportion (35%) mention 'general emissions including those from cars and road transport'.
Other survey findings confirm this picture. Relatively low awareness of energy efficiency and energy saving is common, suggesting that people do not routinely connect domestic energy use with climate change: typically less than half the respondents for example knew the efficiency rating of recently bought electrical appliances such as fridges, freezers and washing machines. The majority (55% of electricity users and 58% of gas users) estimated that they were using the same amount of gas and electricity as in the previous year, and among the 21% who estimated that they were using less, only 16% of electricity users and 13% of gas users cited environmental concerns as the reason. Routine reliance on car travel even for short distances is very common, such that 44% of car users living within a mile of their workplace drove to work. Neither does concern about the environment translate into less car use, as shown by the regression analysis carried out by Davidson et al (2009: 50) .
Altogether there remain significant gaps between the acknowledgement of climate change as important and the recognition of any personal responsibility to make changes; and between recognition of the personal contribution of 'normal consumption' and actual changes in behaviour.
Interpreting Responses to the Question 'Which two or three of the actions on this list do you think would do the most to help reduce climate change?'
All survey respondents who said that they knew at least something about climate change (N=2699) were shown a list of 14 actions 6 and asked to indicate the two or three which they thought were most likely to reduce it. The most common actions cited were recycling (45%), avoiding waste (36%) and using a more fuel efficient car (32%), while using less electricity was nominated by around one quarter (24%) and taking fewer foreign holidays by only 12%.
can be seen as evidence that provision of a public infrastructure, in this case kerbside recycling, which makes change practical, convenient and low cost, has an impact on understanding and behaviour. Actual patterns of use of kerbside recycling support this view: between 66% and 80% of those with access to the services always or mostly use them. Even when the actions required are very simple however, between 13% and 25% choose not to act. It may be that some of them use very few bottles, cans or paper, with others perhaps resistant to separating their waste into different categories for collection. A second, less sanguine, interpretation of responses to the question about actions likely to reduce climate change is that they reflect an assumption that minor adaptations to existing habits will be sufficient. Given that the most commonly cited action was recycling (45%), this could be taken as evidence of a belief that little change is needed, as long as waste is recycled. Similarly the 32% nomination of 'using a more fuel efficient car' may signal belief that expectations about travel and car use need not change, as long as future car purchases take account of fuel efficiency.
Certainly politicians have concluded that there is limited public support for structural measures such as carbon taxes, or stronger regulation of businesses, which are perceived as risky or 'heavy handed'. This is used to justify government adoption of a cautious approach (Hale, 2008) Reliance on small changes reflects a voluntarist model of behaviour, and a 'citizen consumer' identity (Needham, 2003) , derived from neo-liberal political-economy.
This asserts that society is made up of rationally self-interested individuals, who are Hence a third interpretation of the responses to this survey question concerns the assumptions behind the framing of the item itself, which invited answers focusing on individual actions. Although the question gave respondents an opportunity to say 'none of these', the way it was framed excluded answers which prioritise shared responsibility through, for example, use of government powers of regulation in relation to fossil fuel production, energy supply, building standards, manufactured goods or environmental pollution. Neither did it provide an opportunity for a respondent to identify investment in low-carbon infrastructure for public transport, micro-generation schemes, or the development of a smart electricity grid, as an important action.
High levels of household energy and car use certainly indicate that reducing domestic consumption will be necessary in order to meet interim emissions targets, but there are serious limits to what can be achieved by individuals: given a reasonable income, and a degree of control over time use, an individual might choose not to drive a car, or to travel less or use trains instead of planes, or to insulate their house and grow vegetables, but these 'choices' are made difficult by the systematic incentives and constraints of a consumer society: time has become a commodity for spending and saving; public transport is often the more expensive choice and requires more time;
flights may be cheaper and faster than trains; employment, housing and domestic situation may work to increase car dependence, and prevailing social norms valorise spending and consuming more not less. Even assuming willingness to reduce consumption, individuals on their own cannot decide to improve public transport, restrict airport expansion, increase fuel taxes or end subsidies for fossil fuel. There is also evidence that, given the global impacts of climate change, people feel strongly about the need for governments to take the lead (Giddens, 2009 ). Government powers of regulation and taxation create the framework of costs and benefits within which businesses operate, and individuals make choices. These structural issues raise questions about the political analysis and understanding behind the legislation, and are indicative of the contradictions between the primary value placed on maximising economic growth through consumption on the one hand, and policies to cut carbon emissions on the other. however been criticised on the grounds that foregoing consumption now for the sake of future generations will mean less for today's poor (Pearce, 2003) .
Treating society, economy and environment as aligned along a single scale of monetary value may hence make it seem that there is a conflict between prioritising present welfare and prioritising the mitigation of climate change. Economic growth is conventionally viewed as fundamental to ending poverty, so that calls to limit growth and consumption are seen as undermining the momentum to address poverty (Hodder and Martin, 2009; Hulme, 2009) . There is however increasing evidence that the high value placed on economic growth per se as serving the interests of both present and Neither has increasing affluence, measured as growth in GDP and per capita income, correlated with steadily increasing life satisfaction (Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000; Jackson, 2009) . Rising income inequality in societies such as the UK and USA does however correlate with increasing drug and alcohol abuse, obesity, mental health problems and suicide, as well as shorter life expectancy and lower educational achievement (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009 ).
The doubling of the global economy since 1990 (the Kyoto base year) has also been accompanied by a significant rise in global carbon emissions of around 40%, evidence of accelerating global warming, and further degradation of ecosystems on which some of the poorest populations depend for food and water (Jackson, 2009; OECD, 2008; Torres, 2008; UN Human Development Reports 2005 . The current crisis in financial markets has triggered a major global recession, adding to evidence that the belief in unlimited growth in deregulated markets as a means to human welfare is deeply flawed.
Can Liberal Democracies Work to Change Dominant Values?
The combined impact of pluralist politics, materialistic values and commitment to unlimited economic growth poses questions about whether liberal democracies can successfully mitigate climate change (Giddens, 2009; Shearman and Smith, 2007) .
Among the affluent democratic societies, Sweden is generally cited as having the strongest stance on cutting emissions, and this has been attributed to its more egalitarian values, and beliefs that the environment, society and economy are integral parts of wellbeing. Prompted by OPEC oil price increases, energy efficiency has been a matter of public concern since the 1970s. The introduction of a carbon tax in 1991 increased fuel costs (although many key industries receive tax relief or are exempted), and created incentives for investment in district heating schemes, low carbon heat pumps and other energy efficiency measures (Fouche, 2008 (Keating, 2007: 9) . There remains a vital role for 'devolved thinking' about a distinctive Scottish rationale for action, 
Changing Values through Mobilising Civil Society
The most significant shifts in social values seem likely to come about through civil society influencing government: 'People are neither willing nor able to take decisive action alone on an issue of this scale and complexity. But they will very often do so if they have opportunities to act in concert with others' (Hale, 2008: 3 Islands in the UK and a further 40 around the world, is also a prominent community actor, working to facilitate social transition to a low-carbon economy (Seyfang, 2009) . Support for the view that involvement in civil society leads to perceived responsibility to act can be inferred from SEABS08 evidence that volunteering per se is associated with a sense of responsibility for public issues such as climate change:
out of the one third of respondents involved in volunteer activity in the past year, the majority believed that their behaviour contributed to climate change, in comparison with less than half of the non-volunteers (57% of active volunteers rejected the statement that their behaviour and lifestyle did not contribute to climate change, in comparison with 45% of those who were not involved in volunteer activity).
Recent government strategies also recognise the potential for civil society to create momentum for change. Although UK sustainable development strategy is couched in the voluntarist language of 'helping people make better choices', its lead measure for achieving this is a programme of community engagement: 'Community Action 2020 -Together We Can' (Securing the Future: UK Government Sustainable Development Strategy, 2005) explicitly builds on the role of civil society in reshaping consumption.
In Scotland the potential for community action to stimulate change has been recognised by the Climate Challenge Fund, with a budget of £27.4m over three years. 
Conclusion
Public attitudes and behaviour in Scotland can be interpreted as moving towards acceptance of the urgency of action, or more pessimistically as only partially recognising the significance of climate change for the security and welfare of society.
For many people, climate change remains a distant issue, and there is little evidence of broad public engagement with the targets set by climate change legislation, which require substantial reductions in domestic GHG emissions between now and 2020.
Concern about environmental resources and knowledge about climate change are unevenly distributed in the population. Those in higher socio-economic groups, and those with higher levels of education, show most awareness, but this does not translate into reduced consumption and energy saving. Only around half of the population regard their own lifestyle as directly contributing, and this is only slightly higher among those expressing concern about environmental issues. Even fewer people make a direct connection between climate change and personal consumption, car and energy use. The reliance by government on social marketing and individual small changes may be contributing to a belief that minor shifts in lifestyle, such as recycling more waste, will be sufficient. There are therefore major demands on democratic governance, not least in the immediate needs for public education and debate, and in the need to address the gap between general public concern and specific recognition of the necessary changes in domestic consumption. The scale of change envisaged cannot be achieved through relying on the sum of possible individual choices; in addition to extensive public engagement, it requires governments to use all of their powers of regulation to change the framework of price incentives, and to encourage private capital into low-carbon investment.
The current economic crisis is an opportunity to rethink the core values of deregulated markets, consumerism and intensive exploitation of resources for short-term 'Some of the good things in life are corrupted or degraded if turned into commodities, so to decide when to use markets, it's not enough to think about efficiency; we have also to decide how to value the goods in question. Health, education, national defence, criminal justice, environmental protection and so on -these are moral and political questions, not merely economic ones… without ever deciding to do so, we drifted from having a market economy to being a market society' (Sandel, 2009: 10) .
Market society has been associated with rising global inequality, economic instability, and financial and ecological crisis. Around $7 trillion of public money has been committed to securitise risky assets and recapitalise banks, but there is as yet limited political momentum over future alternatives which face up to the severe failure of this set of core values as a means to solve the combined problems of debt, poverty, conflict and climate change. Current public finances depend on perpetual GDP growth to maintain employment and public spending, and to manage macroeconomic relations, and at present there is no alternative politically accepted macroeconomic model for sustainability (Jackson, 2009) . In these circumstances, finding the political courage to engage the public in debate about the kinds of social transformations needed to meet commitments in climate change legislation is understandably challenging.
Moves towards sustainable resource use require a participative politics grounded in civil society, which can facilitate engagement across entrenched divisions, manage distributional conflicts and recognise the damage to prosperity from current market forms. Climate change is not 'just an environmental matter'; it is already a cause of conflict, disease, famine, poverty and death, and will become more so. Scotland's Climate Change legislation demands a transformational politics able to debate the long-term common good, not one of incremental change and individualism. Without this, the ambition to govern climate is likely to be more symbolic than substantive. 
